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Abstract
Can the theory of conceptual spaces developed by Peter Gärdenfors (2000, 2014) and
others be applied to moral issues? Martin Peterson (2017) argues that several moral
principles can be construed as regions in a shared similarity space, but Kristin Shrader-
Frechette (2017) and Gert-Jan Lokhorst (2018) question Peterson’s claim. They argue
that the moral similarity judgments used to construct the space are underspecified and
subjective. In this paper, we present new data indicating that moral principles can
indeed be construed as regions in a multidimensional conceptual space on the basis of
moral similarity judgments. Four hundred and seventy-five students taking a course in
engineering ethics completed a survey in which they were presented with ten cases
(moral choice situations) featuring ethical issues related to technology and engineering.
Participants were asked to judge the moral similarity of each pair of cases (45
comparisons) and to select which moral principle (from a list of five alternatives plus
a sixth option: “none of the principle listed here”) they believed should be applied for
resolving the case. We used interval multidimensional scaling (MDS) as well as
individual differences scaling (INDSCAL) for analyzing the moral similarity judg-
ments. Despite noteworthy individual variations in the judgments, the five moral
principles included in the study were discernable in the aggregate multidimensional
spaces, even for participants with no previous exposure to the principles. Participants
tended to apply the same moral principles to cases rated as morally similar. Our overall
conclusion is that moral similarity judgments, and their representation in
multidimensional spaces, can help us identify moral principles that are relevant for
assessing difficult moral choice situations.
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1 Introduction
The theory of conceptual spaces introduced by Gärdenfors (2000, 2014) has been applied to
topics in psychology, linguistics, computer science, and philosophy (e.g., Chella et al. 2001;
Cubek et al. 2015; Decock et al. 2014; Douven 2016, 2019; Douven et al. 2013; Gärdenfors
and Zenker 2013; Valentine et al. 2016; Verheyen and Égré 2018; Zenker and Gärdenfors,
2015). As explained by Douven and Gärdenfors (2019), the central idea is that concepts can
be modelled as regions in similarity spaces. A stock example is our perceptual color space.
Different shades of blue, such as azur blue, navy blue, light blue, and ice blue are perceived as
more similar to each other than, say, ice blue and mahogany red. By ordering colors
according to their perceived similarity, they can be represented in a cone-shaped conceptual
space along three dimensions (hue, chroma, and lightness) such that the distance between any
two shades represents their degree of similarity. For instance, light blue and ice blue shades
are closer to each other than ice blue and mahogany red (Indow 1988; Shepard 1964).
By modelling concepts as regions in conceptual spaces we can, among other things,
explain why children are able to learn new concepts quickly (Gärdenfors 2000). Rather
than memorizing necessary and sufficient conditions for each concept, children learn to
recognize a small number of prototypes, which they use for categorizing new items. A
penguin is, for example, categorized as a bird rather than a fish because it is judged
more similar to crows and other prototypical birds than to prototypical fish. In this
model, a “bird” in the child’s conceptual space is represented by the region demarcated
by all objects that are more similar to prototypical birds than to any other prototypes.
Morality is a so far underexplored domain for the theory of conceptual spaces. Can
moral principles be construed as conceptual spaces? If so, how? In a recent book, The
Ethics of Technology: A Geometric Analysis of Five Moral Principles, Peterson (2017)
argues that five moral principles commonly applied for assessing the pros and cons of new
and existing technologies can indeed be construed as forming a conceptual space. His work
can be understood as an attempt to apply some of Gärdenfors’ key ideas to ethics.1 The
basic building blocks are moral choice situations, referred to as cases. Peterson asked
participants to make pairwise comparisons of moral similarities across a set of cases and to
select which moral principle (from an open-ended list of principles) should be applied for
resolving each case. On a group level, participants tended to apply the same moral
principles to cases rated as morally similar. Moreover, for some cases considered being
prototypical of a principle, as many as 90 % selected the same principle. These findings
seem to indicate that moral principles can be construed as regions in a shared moral space.
However, Shrader-Frechette (2017) and Lokhorst (2018) criticize this proposal. They claim
that morality most likely displays too many individual differences to yield a single
multidimensional space of moral principles. According to Shrader-Frechette (2017),
each agent likely employs her own implicit dimension(s) to answer Peterson’s
moral-similarity request. Thus for the same two cases, one agent might estimate
“moral similarity” with respect to catastrophic consequences, while another
1 Gärdenfors’ (2000, 2014) work is not concerned with ethics. He does not discuss whether moral principles
could qualify as geometrically construed concepts and he leaves it open how the theory should be empirically
tested. Multidimensional scaling, which is the method we will use, is one of several options mentioned by
Gärdenfors.
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might estimate similarity with respect to fairness. If so, Peterson has a common,
moral-similarity label, but no common concept. Because different agent-
responses likely presuppose different moral-similarity concepts, their responses
don’t make logical contact. If so, there’s little justification for Peterson’s quan-
tifying and aggregating many agents’ moral-similarity estimates.
Peterson (2018) addresses some of the conceptual concerns raised by Shrader-Frechette
and Lokhorst, but he presents no new data. The present study is designed to fill this gap
in the literature. We present results from a large study (n = 475) indicating that moral
principles can indeed be construed as regions in a shared conceptual space. We asked
each participant to make 45 pair-wise comparisons of moral similarities across a set of
ten cases (10 × 9 / 2 comparisons). We then averaged similarity data across participants
and conducted multidimensional scaling (MDS), which enabled us to construe a
“moral” conceptual space. Our findings indicate that measures of group reliability are
high and that there is true structure in averaged similarity data. Contrary to what
Shrader-Frechette suggests, it is thus possible to use the theory of conceptual spaces
for identifying shared moral principles across a group of participants, although there are
also some noteworthy individual variations.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we present the
background and design of the study. In Section 4, we present our findings, including
a discussion of the limitations of using similarity data for characterizing moral principles
as regions in a shared conceptual space. Finally, in Section 5, we state our conclusions.
2 Background and Design of the Study
An appropriate point of departure for the construction of a shared conceptual space for
moral principles is Aristotle’s famous remark in the Nicomachean Ethics that moral
agents should “treat like cases alike”.2 Aristotle’s principle is widely accepted by
contemporary ethicists. For instance, Beauchamp and Childress (1979, 2001) agree that
ethical issues encountered by medical doctors and other healthcare professionals should
sometimes be analyzed by comparing how similar or dissimilar they are to cases we are
already familiar with. Such comparisons help us to identify what principle(s) one ought
to apply to each case. Beauchamp and Childress mention four principles they believe are
applicable prima facie to the biomedical domain: the principle of informed consent, the
principle of nonmaleficence, the principle of beneficence, and the principle of justice.
Peterson (2017) works in the same tradition as Beauchamp and Childress, but
proposes a different set of principles for evaluating new and existing technologies:
the cost-benefit principle (CBA), the precautionary principle (PP), the sustainability
principle (ST), the autonomy principle (AUT), and the fairness principle (FP).3 Another
2 NE 1131a10-b15.
3 The five principles are defined and explained in Peterson (2017). See Appendix A1 for an overview. The set
is open-ended and “could be revised if… we were to encounter new cases that could not be plausibly analyzed
by the five principles” (Peterson 2017: 16). See Chapter 1 for a discussion of how the five principles were
generated (as moral explanations of intuitions about prototype cases) and under what conditions it might be
reasonable to revise the principles. This may happen if we, for instance, encounter cases that are very
dissimilar from the prototypes of the five principles.
important difference is that Peterson explicitly argues that his principles can be
construed as regions in a conceptual space. The key premises of this theory can be
summarized as follows: If two cases are fully similar in all morally relevant aspects,
then, if a principle is applicable to one case, it is also applicable to the other.
Furthermore, if a case is more similar to a prototype for principle p than to the most
similar prototype for any other principle, then the case should be analyzed by applying
p rather than any other principle.
By identifying cases that serve as prototypes for each moral principle, the boundaries
between cases covered by different principles can be represented in a Voronoi tessel-
lation. A Voronoi tessellation divides a conceptual space into a number of regions such
that each region consists of all points that are closer to a prototype for that region than
to any other prototype. Within each region, the moral analysis is governed by the
principle corresponding to the prototype in question. See Fig. 1.
The aim of the present study is to shed light on the empirical adequacy of the
hypothesis that moral principles can be construed as regions in a conceptual space. We
will focus in particular on whether morality yields a shared conceptual space on the
group level, since Shrader-Frechette (2017) and Lokhorst (2018) question precisely
that idea, as mentioned in the introduction.
We invited students taking a course in engineering ethics to complete an online
survey. Participants were presented with ten cases (described in about 100–200 words
each) featuring ethical issues related to technology and engineering. In one part of the
survey, participants were asked to answer the following question: “Which moral
principle should in your opinion be applied to this case?” This was followed by six
options: the cost-benefit principle (CBA), the precautionary principle (PP), the sustain-
ability principle (ST), the autonomy principle (AUT), the fairness principle (FP), and
“none of the principles listed here” (see Appendix A1 for precise formulations). The
ten cases were selected with the intention of identifying two paradigm cases for each






Fig. 1 An example with five moral principles represented as a two-dimensional conceptual space. A particular
case is analyzed by applying the principle applicable to the most similar (nearest) prototype. See Chapter 2 in
Peterson (2017) for details
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similarity comparisons of all cases. For ten cases, this generated 45 pairwise compar-
isons, each of which was preceded by the following question: “How similar are the
following cases from a moral point of view?”. We also varied the order between the two
types of questions in the survey (“Which moral principle …” and “How similar are
….”). In the first version (Survey A), participants were asked to make the similarity
comparisons at the end of the survey; in the second version (Survey B), they were
asked to make the similarity comparisons at the beginning.
Similarity data collected in both surveys were analyzed with multidimensional
scaling techniques (MDS; Borg and Groenen 2005; Kruskal and Wish 1978). The
term MDS refers to a family of statistical models that represent measurements of
(dis)similarity among pairs of stimuli as distances between points in a low-
dimensional multidimensional space. This makes it possible to uncover nonobvious
structures among stimuli. Without offering instructions to participants about the char-
acteristics on which the similarity judgments are to be made, and without having
participants verbalize their considerations, the basis of their judgments can be revealed
by relating geometric properties of the representation (e.g., dimensions, partitions,
clusters, …) to substantive information about the represented stimuli. In interval
MDS, all pairs of stimuli i and j are positioned in space such that their distance dij
corresponds to a linear transformation of their perceived similarity f(sij) (with smaller
distances denoting greater similarity and vice versa). The distances between points i
and j are normally measured by using the familiar Euclidean metric, but alternative
distance functions are of course possible and sometimes more appropriate.
The extent to which the distances represented in MDS successfully capture the
transformed input similarities is reflected in the squared error of each representation: [f
(sij)-dij]2. These discrepancies can be depicted in a Shepard diagram to determine which
pairs are particularly poorly represented. A Shepard diagram contains a scatter plot of
the input similarities versus the corresponding distances in the MDS space, as well as a
regression line representing the optimally transformed similarities. A point’s squared
vertical distance from the regression line indicates the corresponding pair’s residual
error. The discrepancies can also be summed across all pairs in which a particular
stimulus features, to establish how badly an individual point is fitted, or summed across
all pairs to obtain an indication of how well the input similarities as a whole are
represented. The former measure is commonly referred to as stress per point, while the
latter is called stress.4 If these badness-of-fit indications are sufficiently low, MDS
yields a visual representation of the empirical relations that exist between the stimuli,
which tend to be easier to interpret than the numerical indices of these relationships.
Information about the participants providing the similarity judgments can be in-
voked for analyzing variations among individual responses. Individual differences
scaling (INDSCAL; Carroll and Chang 1970; Takane et al. 1977) structurally incor-
porates individual differences by estimating individual weights for each of the dimen-
sions of a so-called group space. By multiplying an individual’s weights with the
coordinates of the stimuli in the group space, one arrives at that individual’s individual
stimulus representation. The weights thus achieve a stretching or compression of the
group space, reflecting the importance each individual attaches to different dimensions
4 In practice, a measure called stress-1 tends to be used, which corresponds to a normalization of the stress
value by dividing it by the sum of the squared distances dij and taking the square root of the result.
of that space. The better we can approximate an individual’s similarity data through a
weighting of the dimensions of the group space, the lower the stress-per-person (the
stress measure for that particular person) will be. If the group space shows no
correspondence at all to an individual’s similarity data, that will be visible in the
estimated dimension weights, which will tend to be close to zero (indicating that the
organization of the stimuli along the dimensions of the group space bears no resem-
blance to the similarity structure provided by the individual).
In the following sections, we use interval MDS as well as INDSCAL for analyzing
the moral similarity judgments reported by participants. The aim is to determine
whether these similarity judgments provide a sufficiently reliable basis for constructing
a common space of moral principles.
3 Methods
3.1 Participants
Four hundred and seventy-five students taking a mandatory course in engineering ethics at
the College Station campus of Texas A&MUniversity’s College of Engineering completed
one of two versions of an online survey in exchange for partial course credit. From the 219
students who fully completed SurveyA, 46were removed (21%) because they failed at least
one control question, indicated not to understand the instructions, and/or indicated that their
effort was insufficient for including their data in a scientific report. A total of 173 responses
to Survey A were thus retained for further analysis. From the 256 students who fully
completed Survey B, 37 were removed (14%) for a total of 219 participants in Survey B.
The median time spent by these participants on the survey was 25 min, 59 s.
At the request of the Institutional Review Board at Texas A&M University, no
demographic information was collected. However, the demographics of the student
sample that was invited to participate is publicly available at https://accountability.
tamu.edu/All-Metrics/Mixed-Metrics/Student-Demographics. It was mainly comprised
of men (78.2% versus 21.8% female). The majority of the students in the class were
aged 18–21 (53.00%) or 22–25 (35.13%). The most represented ethnicities were White
(46.6%), Hispanic (21.02%), International (14.58%), and Asian (11.80%).
3.2 Materials
Participants were presented with ten cases (vignettes, described in about 100–200
words each) featuring ethical issues related to technology and engineering. Each case
was chosen to be representative of one of five moral principles: the cost-benefit
principle (CBA), the precautionary principle (PP), the sustainability principle (ST),
the autonomy principle (AUT), and the fairness principle (FP). Care was taken that the
two cases deemed prototypical of a particular principle did not share apparent surface or
content similarities. For instance, the two cases for the AUT principle were set in China
and the US. One dealt with internet censorship and the other with fracking.
Table 1 provides an overview of the 10 cases and the five principles designed to be
applicable to them. See Appendices A1 and A2 for precise definitions of each moral
principle and summaries of the cases. Some cases were identical to those used by
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Peterson (2017), but since our aim was to identify two prototypes for each principle, a
couple of new cases were developed from scratch.
3.3 Procedure
Participants completed an online survey consisting of an applicability and a similarity
judgment task. There were two versions of the survey: In Survey A participants
completed the applicability task before the similarity task; in Survey B participants
completed these tasks in reverse order.
In the applicability task, participants were asked to answer the following question for
each of the 10 moral cases: “Which moral principle should in your opinion be applied
to this case?” This was followed by six answer options: the five principles (including
their definition) listed in Appendix A1 and “none of the principles listed here”. We
randomized the order in which the cases were presented, as well as the answer options
for each case.
In the similarity judgment task, participants were invited to make pairwise
similarity comparisons of all cases. For ten cases, this generated 45 pairwise
comparisons, each of which was preceded by the following question: “How similar
are the following cases from a moral point of view?” We offered no instructions
concerning the characteristics on which these similarity judgments were to be made.
We explicitly indicated that participants were NOT to make their judgments based
on accidental factual, physical, or historical similarities between the cases. Partic-
ipants provided their responses on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “very
dissimilar” to “very similar”. We randomized the order in which the pairs of cases
were presented. Prior to the start of the applicability and similarity tasks, partici-
pants were asked to indicate whether they understood the instructions.
A key difference between the present study and that reported in Peterson (2017:
Chapter 3) is that every participant in the present study was instructed to compare all
possible combinations of all ten cases, instead of just making a small subset of such
comparisons. This generated a relatively high workload for participants, so to ensure
that they were paying attention we included three control questions of the type “This is
Table 1 Overview of the 10 moral cases included in the study
Case Presumed principle Identifier
Prioritizing Design Improvements in Cars Cost-Benefit CBA1
The Cost of CO2 Emissions Cost-Benefit CBA2
The Challenger Disaster Precautionary PP1
Is Trichloroethylene a Human Carcinogen? Precautionary PP2
The Ten Mile Creek Basin Sustainability ST1
Biodiesel in the Transport Sector Sustainability ST2
Internet Censorship and Surveillance in China Autonomy AUT1
Fracking and Self-governance in Denton Autonomy AUT2
Broadband Access in North Dakota Fairness FP1
The SpaceX Launchpad in Boca Chica Fairness FP2
a control question to check whether you are paying attention. Please proceed by
clicking 1 (Very dissimilar) on the scale below.” At the end of the survey, participants
answered an additional question that read: “Have you answered the questions to the
best of your ability? Do you feel that your effort is sufficient for including your data in
a scientific research report? Please be honest. You will receive the extra credit
regardless of how you answer this question.” Participants answered by either clicking
“Yes, I have answered the questions to the best of my ability. Please include my
answers in your study.” or “No, I think my answers should be omitted, but I will
receive the extra credit anyway.”
4 Results
4.1 Reliability
We determined the reliability of the similarity judgments by applying the Spearman-
Brown formula to the split-half correlations (Spearman 1904). The reliability of
similarity data in both Survey A and Survey B was established at .99. The reliability
remained at a high value of .97 for both Survey A and B when the data were split in half
(first half of participants, second half of participants, even participants, uneven partic-
ipants) so this does not appear to be an artefact of simply having a large number of
participants provide the similarity judgments. If we restrict the sample size to 10% of
the original samples (17 participants for Survey A and 22 participants for Survey B)
and calculate the reliability for 1000 such samples, we still get average reliabilities of
.88 and .86, respectively.
Similarity data in Survey A and B were averaged and transformed to dissimilarities
by subtracting the average similarity for each pair from 8 (the maximum similarity scale
value plus one). The resulting dissimilarities were subjected to interval multidimen-
sional scaling using the smacof package (De Leeuw and Mair 2009) in R version 3.6.1
(R Core Team 2017). Following Peterson (2017), we obtained solutions in two and
three dimensions. The resulting stress-1 values were .155 and .088 for Survey A, and
.167 and .088 for Survey B. These empirical badness-of-fit values are lower than the
stress-1 values obtained for random input dissimilarities. The average stress-1 value
across 10,000 simulated data sets comprising 10 by 10 dissimilarities randomly
sampled from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 equals .235 for two-
dimensional MDS configurations and .140 for three-dimensional MDS configurations
with standard deviations of .020 and .016, respectively. The empirical stress-1 values
fall just below the critical values of .174 (in 2D) and .092 (in 3D) obtained by taking the
mean stress-1 value for the random data minus 3 times the standard deviation (Spence
and Ogilvie 1973).
The MDS configurations for Survey A as well as Survey B also pass a permutation
test in which the empirical stress-1 values are compared to a distribution of stress-1
values obtained by subjecting permutations of the empirical input (dis) similarities to
MDS (Mair et al. 2016). An advantage of this procedure (over the comparison with
randomly generated dissimilarities discussed in the previous paragraph) is that it
respects the nature of the data. It yields a test of the assumption that the input (dis)
similarities are interchangeable. Assuming an α = .05, this null hypothesis is rejected
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for the Survey A data in two (p = .0003) and three dimensions (p = .0007) as well as for
the Survey B data (p = .0009 and p = .0008, respectively).5
4.2 Organization of the Moral Spaces
The upper panels of Figs. 2 and 3 show two- and three-dimensional MDS representations
of the averaged similarity data in Survey A (left) and Survey B (right). Note that the 10
moral cases are similarly organized in both MDS configurations, in two as well as in three
dimensions. This indicates that there is common structure underlying these representa-
tions. If they had been based on random or widely diverging similarity judgments, the 10
cases would almost certainly have been positioned differently in different spaces. There-
fore, the observation that theMDS configurations for SurveyA and Survey B yield similar
structures signals that the same considerations informed the underlying similarity judg-
ments. It also indicates that there is no apparent effect of having participants apply the
moral principles to the cases before (Survey A) or after (Survey B) making similarity
judgments. Regardless of whether participants were primed or not with the five moral
principles, they appear to perceive the 10 cases in a similar way.
The MDS configurations also show that the two cases that were presumed to be
prototypical for each of the included moral principles (see Table 1) cluster together in
space. This indicates that the principles that were used for the construction and
selection of the cases informed the participants’ similarity judgments. There is no
reason for these cases to end up so close together in space unless participants picked
up on these commonalities in their assessments of moral similarities.6 Because cases
that are prototypical for a principle cluster together in similarity space, they can be used
to carve out regions in space that denote the five moral principles. One can thus identify
a Voronoi tessellation of the similarity space, in which each Voronoi cell is comprised
of those points in space that are closest to the two prototypical instances of each
principle. That is, one can conceive of the similarity space as a “moral” conceptual
space representing the cost-benefit principle (CBA), the precautionary principle (PP),
the sustainability principle (ST), the autonomy principle (AUT), and the fairness
principle (FP), each represented by two prototypes. Note that this is only formally
achievable in the three-dimensional configurations (Fig. 3). In the two-dimensional
configurations (Fig. 2), the AUT and FP cases cannot be clearly discerned; doing so
requires the addition of a third dimension. Mirroring the close similarity between the
AUT and FP cases, the fairness principle was often applied to the autonomy cases and
vice versa (Table 2 shows the number of times each principle was applied to the 10
cases). We will return to the implications of this finding in Section 4.5.
4.3 Individual Differences
Although the average similarity data for surveys A and B are reliable, there are some
noteworthy individual differences among participants. The average correlation between
5 Similar results were obtained with non-metric MDS. In non-metric MDS, the transformation of the perceived
similarities f(sij) is monotonic instead of linear as in interval MDS.
6 As noted earlier, we took care to limit surface similarities between cases belonging to the same moral
principle, and we also instructed participants to disregard accidental factual, physical, or historical similarities
between cases.
participants’ similarity judgments is only .29 for Survey A and .23 for Survey B. This
considerable inter-individual variability is mirrored in the variability found in the
applicability judgments (i.e., the responses to the question about which principle should
be applied to each case). Fleiss’s (1971) kappa for the applicability data in Survey A is
.44 and for Survey B it is .47, which is about halfway between perfect agreement and
agreement due to chance. Only 9% of participants (8% in Survey A and 10% in Survey
B) classified all 10 cases as we had intended. The prototypical cases are, however,
identified as prime examples of the five moral principles, as is shown in Table 2. The
principle we had intended to be chosen was the predominantly chosen principle for
each of the 10 cases, both in Survey A and B. However, the applicability percentages in
Table 2 indicate that the cases designed to be prototypical for the cost-benefit and the
fairness principles were considered less prototypical than the cases for the other
principles. The precautionary principle was often found to apply to CBA1, while the
sustainability principle was often found to apply to CBA2. Many participants found the
cost-benefit principle to also apply to FP1 and the autonomy principle to FP2.
Fig. 2 Two-dimensional configurations of the Survey A (left) and Survey B (right) similarity data. The upper
panels represent the configurations obtained for the average similarity data using regular interval MDS. The
lower panels represent the group configurations obtained with individual differences scaling (INDSCAL). The
configurations were brought into the same orientation using Procrustes analysis (Gower and Dijksterhuis
2004)
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Participants in Survey A as well as in Survey B almost always judged at least one of the
five moral principles to be applicable to the ten moral cases. The option “none of the
Fig. 3 Three-dimensional configurations of the Survey A (left) and Survey B (right) similarity data.
The upper panels represent the configurations obtained for the average similarity data using regular
interval MDS. The lower panels represent the group configurations obtained with individual
differences scaling (INDSCAL). The configurations were brought into the same orientation using
Procrustes analysis (Gower and Dijksterhuis 2004)
Table 2 Principle applicability percentages for each of the 10 moral cases in Surveys A and B
Cost-Benefit Precautionary Sustainability Autonomy Fairness None
A B A B A B A B A B A B
CBA1 .58 .68 .27 .22 .02 .01 .05 .01 .04 .02 .03 .05
CBA2 .46 .55 .17 .12 .33 .27 .02 .01 .01 .02 .00 .02
PP1 .03 .02 .86 .82 .00 .00 .03 .03 .02 .01 .06 .11
PP2 .02 .04 .86 .79 .06 .07 .02 .05 .03 .01 .02 .03
ST1 .13 .10 .03 .03 .75 .76 .02 .02 .03 .04 .04 .05
ST2 .15 .14 .06 .06 .73 .76 .01 .01 .01 .00 .03 .03
AUT1 .01 .00 .03 .04 .01 .01 .83 .81 .10 .11 .02 .03
AUT2 .05 .01 .04 .03 .12 .08 .69 .78 .08 .10 .03 .00
FP1 .19 .14 .01 .00 .03 .02 .08 .12 .65 .66 .05 .06
FP2 .05 .08 .06 .05 .05 .02 .17 .23 .62 .59 .05 .03
Total .17 .18 .24 .22 .21 .20 .19 .21 .16 .16 .03 .04
principles listed here” was chosen in no more than 3% of the 10 × 173 trials in Survey
A and in 4% of the 10 × 219 trials in Survey B.
We performed individual differences scaling (INDSCAL; Carroll and Chang 1970;
Takane et al. 1977) on the similarity data for Survey A and Survey B, which yielded
group configurations (lower panels of Figs. 2 and 3) that were very similar to the
configurations of the average data (upper panels of Figs. 2 and 3).7 The INDSCAL
analyses yielded no individuals with weights close to zero, which would have been an
indication that those individuals’ data did not line up very well with the group space.
The minimum individual weights for data in Survey A when analyzed in two dimen-
sions were .82 and .99, and in three dimensions .76, .93, and 1.25. The minimum
individual weights for data in Survey B when analyzed in two dimensions were .88 and
.93, and in three dimensions .86, .89, and 1.15.
The INDSCAL analyses also yielded a quantitative indication of how well a
participant matches the group configuration: the stress-per-person is lower the better
that person’s data can be obtained through a weighting of the group configuration’s
dimensions. We established a positive correlation between stress-per-person and the
number of misclassifications of a person (identified as the number of times out of 10
that the person selected a different principle for a case than the one we intended). For
Survey A, we established Pearson’s linear correlation coefficient at .31 (p < .0001) in
both two and three dimensions. For Survey B, these values measured .26 (p = .0001)
and .35 (p < .0001), respectively. These correlations suggest that the more one believes
other principles apply to the moral cases, the less one’s similarity configuration fits the
group organization in terms of the 5 × 2 prototypes.
4.4 Boundary Conditions
The observation that we can identify a common structure in averaged similarity
judgments only holds when two prototypes per principle are included. From the
similarity data in both Survey A and Survey B one can construct 32 different data sets
with one prototype per principle if one considers all possible combinations of proto-
typical cases. When these data sets were subjected to interval MDS, the large majority
failed the permutation test at α = .05, both for Survey A and for Survey B and in two
and three dimensions.8 When only one prototypical case is included per principle, the
null hypothesis that the input (dis) similarities are interchangeable thus cannot be
rejected.9 This suggests that the structure we established in the spaces with two
prototypical cases per moral principle is mostly local. It appears to derive primarily
from the high similarity of the two prototypes for each principle. This observation is
corroborated by the Shepard diagrams (not shown) that indicate that the smaller
dissimilarities are better captured by the MDS distances than the larger dissimilarities.
7 One participant provided identical similarity judgments for all pairs in Survey B. This participant was
excluded from the INDSCAL analysis to overcome technical issues.
8 The stress test is not well-defined for data sets with a small number of items (here: 5) and therefore not
considered here.
9 A similar conclusion was reached based on the analyses of similarity judgments obtained for cases CBA1,
PP1, ST1, AUT1, and FP1 in a sample of 204 students drawn from the same course in engineering ethics
(none of whom had participated in Survey A or B).
S. Verheyen, M. Peterson
The structure that is present in the MDS configurations of the entire set of cases
appears to largely reflect the applicability of the five moral principles. For each
participant, we constructed an alternative similarity matrix based on the principles they
applied to each of the cases. Pairs of cases that were awarded the same principle received
a similarity score of 1; pairs of cases that were awarded different principles a similarity
score of 0. (This procedure corresponds to the free sorting procedure for obtaining
similarity data used in manyMDS applications, where participants sort stimuli into piles
with the understanding that stimuli in the same pile have something in common, while
stimuli in different piles do not; Borg and Groenen 2005; Miller 1969). The individual
similarity matrices were averaged across participants, subsequently transformed to a
dissimilaritymatrix by subtracting the average similarity for each pair from 1, which was
then subjected to interval MDS. The resulting three-dimensional configurations for the
Survey A applicabilities (left) and the Survey B applicabilities (right) are shown in Fig.
4. They closely resemble the configurations in Fig. 3, both in terms of the clustering of
the two prototypical cases per principle, but also in terms of the overall structure of the
configuration. This suggests that the larger distances in the original, similarity-based
configurations tend to capture some of the systematic differences in opinion as to
whether which principles apply to the cases, in that cases that are seldomly awarded
the same principle are also judged to be less similar.
Because of the pronounced inter-individual differences, a certain number of partic-
ipants is required to obtain reliable MDS configurations. While the two- and three-
dimensional configurations obtained on half of the similarity data (first half of partic-
ipants, second half of participants, even participants, uneven participants) all pass both
the stress and permutation tests, a considerable number of configurations fail these tests
when they are based on similarity data from a smaller sample. We randomly drew 100
samples of varying sizes of similarity data from Survey A and Survey B and subjected
the averaged data from each sample to interval MDS. With samples sizes of 20, 41% of
Survey A samples and 30% of Survey B samples failed at least one of the tests in two
dimensions. The corresponding percentages in three dimensions were 50% and 37%.
Although the reliability of such samples is quite high (see section 4.1 for the average
reliabilities for samples corresponding to 10% of the sample ≈ N = 20), these results
signal the need to conduct MDS-specific tests to assess whether the resulting MDS
Fig. 4 Three-dimensional configurations of the Survey A (left) and Survey B (right) applicability data. The
number of times pairs of cases were awarded the same moral principle was subjected to regular interval MDS.
The configurations were brought into the same orientation as the ones in Fig. 3 using Procrustes analysis
(Gower and Dijksterhuis 2004)
configurations should be interpreted. With sample sizes of 40, the percentage of
samples that failed at least one of the tests halved, to 19% and 14% in two dimensions,
and 28% and 9% in three dimensions for Survey A and Survey B, respectively. With a
sample size of 80 (nearing half of our original sample sizes), almost all samples passed
both tests. The corresponding percentages of samples failing at least one test were 6%,
3%, 14%, and 1%.
4.5 Key Findings
The most important finding in light of the criticism voiced by Shrader-Frechette (2017)
and Lokhorst (2018) is that there is common structure to be found in averaged
similarity judgments of moral choice situations. The high reliability measures indicate
that the averaged similarity judgments are stable across groups. This is a requirement
for the MDS configurations to be representative of a structure shared among partici-
pants (Ashby et al. 1994; Lee and Pope 2003) and for the configurations to be
replicable (Sturidsson et al. 2006; Voorspoels et al. 2014; White et al. 2014). The
stress tests and permutation tests conducted on the MDS configurations of the average
similarity data indicate that there is structure underlying these configurations. The data
generation process triggering the similarity judgments is thus neither random or
completely idiosyncratic (Spence and Ogilvie 1973; see also Klahr 1969, Stenson
and Knoll 1969, and Sturrock and Rocha 2000), nor are the similarity judgments of
different moral cases interchangeable (Mair et al. 2016).
The three-dimensional MDS configurations indicate that the two cases deemed
prototypical of each principle cluster together. This finding supports Peterson’s
(2017) claim that by applying MDS to similarity judgments of moral choice
situations one can construct conceptual spaces in which moral principles are
discernable as distinct regions. Moreover, by assessing the similarity of new moral
cases to the ones that are prototypical for the five principles, it is possible to
determine which principle to apply when assessing new cases (see Chapter 3 in
Peterson 2017, for an illustration). However, in the two-dimensional MDS repre-
sentations this structure did not come out as expected. As noted, the cases
representing the autonomy and fairness principles could not be discerned in two-
dimensional representations. One might perhaps argue that this was due to those
representations lacking one of the three dimensions that differentiate the princi-
ples. However, one could also take this observation to be a reason for preferring a
more parsimonious space with, for instance, four instead of five principles.10
Conversely, one can also imagine enriching the space by adding cases deemed
to be prototypical of other moral principles and study whether those cases are
sufficiently different from the ones already present in the space.11
10 It is worth keeping in mind that it may be no easy task to formulate a single principle that articulates
intuitions about fairness and autonomy, but not any of the other values alluded to in the other principles.
11 What constitutes a sufficient difference or a sufficient similarity is another question, which we do not
attempt to answer here, but can be addressed through clustering. See Verbeemen, Vanpaemel, Pattyn, Storms,
and Verguts (2007) for an example. An alternative approach might be to recognize explicitly that cases have
both overlapping and distinctive features and represent the similarities through additive cluster models
(Shepard and Arabie 1979) or extended trees (Corter and Tversky 1986) instead of geometric spaces.
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The observation that the cost-benefit principle (CBA), the precautionary principle
(PP), the sustainability principle (ST), the autonomy principle (AUT), and the
fairness principle (FP) can be discerned in a constructed moral space for participants
without previous exposure to the principles (in Survey B the applicability task was
preceded by the similarity judgment task) speaks to the relevance of these principles.
Similarity judgments of moral cases and their representation in multidimensional
spaces can thus help us identify the moral principles that are relevant for assessing
technological innovations.
We note that these findings hold when the data is split in half. However, when data
of fewer participants is used, the observed structure begins to break down. This is due
to individual differences among participants. To obtain a stable, reliable structure one
needs to obtain similarity judgments from a sufficiently large number of individuals,
and the similarity judgments must not be heavily influenced by individuals whose
opinions deviate strongly from the majority. We observed pronounced individual
differences with respect to both the applicability and the similarity tasks. The results
of the individual differences scaling suggest a relationship between the two: the more a
participant feels that individual cases should be judged along different principles (rather
than the ones intended), the less the participant agrees on the general configuration
depicting the intended structure. This highlights a clear avenue for future research,
namely to further investigate the origin and nature of these individual differences.
Another noteworthy finding is that several prototypes per principle have to be
included to delineate all principles clearly. This is not problematic from a theoret-
ical point of view. Several theorists working on conceptual spaces have argued for
the importance of using multiple prototypes per concept, or regions of prototypical
instances, per concept (e.g., Douven et al. 2013; Gärdenfors and Williams 2001;
Regier et al. 2005; Storms et al. 2000). The decision to include several prototypes
per principle may also have some additional advantages in moral contexts: If one
conceives of the boundaries of a principle as the points that are equidistant between
unique prototypes, then all boundaries between principles will be sharp. This
corresponds to a moral theory in which a single moral principle governs (the
perception of) a moral case. Beauchamp and Childress (1979, 2001), Peterson
(2017), and others stress that it is often appropriate to apply more than one principle
to a case. By using several prototypes per principle, we can model this plausible
idea: Instead of having a unique delineation of the similarity space based on
individual prototypes, we can produce multiple delineations based on the combi-
nations of different prototypes per principle. Some cases will fall within the region
covered by one principle on one delineation, but in the region of another principle
on another delineation. The proportion of times a case falls under a particular
principle (i.e., is found to be more similar to a chosen prototype of one principle
than to a choice of prototypes representing other principles) can be used as a rough
measure of the extent to which the principle applies (Decock and Douven 2014;
Douven 2016; Douven et al. 2017; Verheyen and Égré 2018. See also Peterson
2017: Chapter 2). This allows for borderline cases to which more than one principle
applies. Consider, for instance, the description of the Challenger Disaster in Ap-
pendix A2. If we were to include quantitative information about the costs of
postponing the launch of the shuttle, it seems likely that this case would be placed
in a gray area in which both the cost-benefit and precautionary principles apply.
5 Discussion
Our findings indicate that five moral principles frequently applied for analyzing ethical
issues related to technology and engineering can be represented as regions in a shared
moral space. Although we found noteworthy individual differences among participants,
averaged similarity judgments of moral choice situations display a common and stable
structure, contrary to the intuitions voiced by Shrader-Frechette (2017) and Lokhorst
(2018). It seems likely that parallel representations in other domains of (applied) ethics
are also possible. We would, for instance, not be surprised if the four principles
proposed by Beauchamp and Childress (1979, 2001) for the biomedical domain (the
principle of informed consent, the principle of nonmaleficence, the principle of benef-
icence, and the principle of justice) could be similarly represented in a shared moral
space. If so, it would be interesting to investigate whether Beauchamp and Childress’
moral space could be integrated with that for technology and engineering, as some
borderline cases seem to belong to both (e.g., the development of new drugs). It is
beyond the scope of this paper to investigate this here. However, future research may
show if different domains of applied ethics can be subsumed in a higher dimensional
space and whether those dimensions are integral or separable.
That said, we are of course aware that not every moral theorist will welcome our
approach, for several reasons. To begin with, it might be objected that it is a mistake to
develop several moral principles. All we need is a single principle that covers all cases.
For instance, John Stuart Mill (1865) famously claims that an act is right just in case it
maximizes overall utility, and Kant (1785) argues that an act is right only as long as it
does not violate his categorical imperative.12 We agree with Mill and Kant that unary
accounts of morality are elegant and attractive from a theoretical point of view, but we
insist that no single principle can explain the descriptive findings reported in this paper.
If a single principle governs people’s similarity judgments, then all cases in which, say,
the categorical imperative was perceived as satisfied would have been judged fully
similar to each other. Moreover, cases in which the categorical imperative was believed
violated, would have been rated as maximally dissimilar to cases in which that is not
the case. However, as noted in Section 4, we did not observe this type of binary or
highly polarized similarity judgments. Moral outlooks that include several principles
offer a better fit with our findings.
Another worry moral theorists may voice concerns the somewhat inflexible
nature of the principles generated from similarity judgments. In Ross’s (1930)
well-known theory of prima facie duties, each of his seven principles is valid only
in so far as it is not overruled by another principle. Ross claims that in order to
determine what one ought to do all things considered, all prima facie principles
have to be balanced against each other. This dynamic process will eventually
enable the agent to identify his duty proper. However, the five principles we
generate from similarity data do not seem to allow for this type of balancing of
conflicting duties or values, meaning that they are more inflexible than Ross’s
12 Kant proposed several formulations of the categorical imperative. The perhaps most well-known one is the
following: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law.”
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principles. Our response is that some flexibility can be achieved in our model by
letting the boundaries of each principle be defined by more than one prototypical
case, as noted in Section 4. If each principle is represented by several prototypes,
then the regions covered by the principles will overlap. We admit that the
balancing process itself is not captured by our account; the similarity judgments
describe the situation after the balancing process. Therefore, although our account
does not capture all aspects of Ross’s famous theory, we believe it is compatible
with some of its most important features.
At no point in this paper have we attempted to derive an “ought” from an “is”. We
accept what moral philosophers call Hume’s Law, meaning that we do not believe it is
possible to derive any normative recommendations from purely descriptive premises.
Our aim is to study the moral opinions people actually hold; we are not making any
claim about what opinions one ought to hold. However, we nevertheless believe these
descriptive findings are relevant, in indirect ways, for addressing normative issues.
First, our model makes it possible to check whether a set of moral judgments is
internally coherent in the following sense: Do agents apply the same moral principle
to cases they believe to be similar from a moral point of view? If some cases that are
judged similar (meaning that they are located in the same region of moral space) were
not treated alike, then those judgments would violate Aristotle’s dictum that we should
“treat like cases alike”. Second, if we believe that peoples’ similarity judgments are, on
average, reasonably accurate, then we can analyze new cases not included in our study
by comparing how similar they are to the prototypical cases we already know how to
analyze. The premise that bridges the gap between “is” and “ought” here, is the
assumption that peoples’ similarity judgments are reasonably accurate.
Our final comment concerns the possibility of applying the methodology outlined in
this paper to legal issues. In the common law tradition, judges routinely compare how
similar or dissimilar new cases are to cases ruled on in previous court rulings. The
normative assumption underpinning this is, again, Aristotle’s insight that judges should
“treat like cases alike”. We note that our approach could be used for constructing legal
similarity spaces that are analogous to the moral spaces constructed in this paper. By
measuring legal similarities and dissimilarities across a set of legal cases, one could
map the corresponding cases onto a multidimensional legal space. One could then
verify whether cases located close to each other are treated alike, and perhaps identify
the legal principle(s) applied to each case. If it transpires that cases that legal experts (or
law students, or lay people) perceive as similar from a legal point of view are not
treated alike, this could be a reason for questioning the underlying court rulings. This
indicates that the approach to normative reasoning outlined in this paper can be applied
to a fairly broad domain of issues.
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Appendix
Appendix A1: Definition of the 5 moral principles after Peterson (2017)
& The Cost-Benefit Principle (CBA): A technological intervention is morally right
only if the net surplus of benefits over costs for all those affected is greater than that
of every alternative.
& The Precautionary Principle (PP): A technological intervention is morally right only
if reasonable precautionary measures are taken to safeguard against non-negligible
but uncertain threats.
& The Sustainability Principle (ST): A technological intervention is morally right only
if it does not lead to any significant long-term depletion of natural, social or
economic resources.
& The Autonomy Principle (AUT): A technological intervention is morally right only
if it does not reduce the independence, self-governance or freedom of the people
affected by it.
& The Fairness Principle (FP): A technological intervention is morally right only if it
does not lead to unfair inequalities among the people affected by it.
Appendix A2: Overview of the 10 moral cases
Cost-Benefit Principle cases
CBA1: Prioritizing Design Improvements in Cars In the mid 1990’s it was proposed that
various automobile design improvements should be made mandatory by the U.S. National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). According to Tengs et al. (1995) the cost
of implementing each design improvement, expressed in dollars per life-year saved, would
have varied between $0 and $450,000. (See the list below.) The benefit of each design
improvement listed below is the prevention of one statistical death per year. Granting a
limited budget, would it be morally right to prioritize the most cost-effective safety
improvement (installing windshields with adhesive bonding) over other costlier options?
& Install windshields with adhesive bonding $0.
& Automobile dummy acceleration (vs. side door strength) tests $63,000.
& Collapsible (vs. traditional) steering columns in cars $67,000.
& Front disk (vs. drum) brakes in cars $240,000.
& Dual master cylinder braking system in cars $450,000.
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CBA2: The Cost of CO2 Emissions. The Scientific American reports that under the
Obama administration, multiple agencies working together came to the conclusion that
emissions of CO2 in the U.S. cost $121 billion in damage per year. When factoring in
how much CO2 is emitted, this means that every ton of carbon dioxide emitted into the
atmosphere costs the U.S. about $21. An anonymous official working for the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency said “$21 doesn’t really justify much” and estimates from
U.S. Global Change Research Program indicate that only an assessment of between
$36 and $88 per ton would justify the costs of doing what is necessary to significantly
reduce CO2 emissions. Thus, those wanting to curb CO2 emissions must find ways to
assess more damage if they wish to justify more regulation. Would it be morally right to
spend tax money on reducing CO2 emissions if the cost significantly exceeds the value
of the damage prevented by the regulation?
Precautionary Principle cases
PP1: The Challenger Disaster. On January 28, 1986, the Challenger space shuttle
exploded shortly after take-off from Cape Canaveral, killing its crew of seven astro-
nauts. The cause of the explosion was a leaking O-ring in a fuel tank, which could not
cope with the unusually low temperature at the day of the take-off. About six months
before take-off, engineer Roger Boisjoly at Morton Thiokol, the company responsible
for the fuel tank, had written a memo in which he warned that low temperatures could
cause a leak in the O-ring: “The result would be a catastrophe of the highest order —
loss of human life”. However, Boisjoly was unable to back up his claim with data. His
point was that for all they knew a leak in the O-ring could cause an explosion, but there
was no or little data to confirm or refute that suspicion. The night before the launch
Boisjoly reiterated his warning to his superiors. Was it morally right for Boisjoly’s
superiors to ignore his unproven warning?
PP2: Is Trichloroethylene a Human Carcinogen? Trichloroethylene is a clear non-
flammable liquid commonly used as a solvent for a variety of organic materials. It
was first introduced in the 1920s and widely used for a variety of purposes until the
1970s, when suspicions arose that trichloroethylene could be toxic. A number of
scientific studies of trichloroethylene were initiated and in the 1990s researchers at
the U.S. National Cancer Institute showed that trichloroethylene is carcinogenic in
animals, but there was no consensus on whether it was also a human carcinogen. In
2011 the U.S. National Toxicology Program’s 12th Report on Carcinogens concluded
that trichloroethylene can be “reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen”.
Would it have been morally right to ban trichloroethylene for use as a solvent for
organic materials in the 1990s?
Sustainability Principle cases
ST1: The Ten Mile Creek Basin The Ten Mile Creek project is part of the larger
Everglades Restoration Project, which covers 16 counties over an 18,000 square-mile
area. The project seeks to restore, protect and preserve the water resources of central
and southern Florida. By capturing freshwater from Ten Mile Creek and storing it
during the rainy season, the amount of freshwater and sediment entering waterways can
be controlled. Construction consisted of a 6000 acre-feet above ground reservoir; a
pump station; a gated-water control structure for moderating the release of water back
into the creek; a gated gravity control structure for draining the facility for maintenance
purposes; and control structures between the deep water storage area and appurtenant
structures. In addition to the obvious environmental benefits of the project, St. Lucie
County will use part of the site as a nature preserve area to promote hiking, fishing, bird
watching and other outdoor activities. Was it morally right to build the Ten Mile Creek
Basin? (Source: Skanska Group; quoted verbatim except the last sentence).
ST2: Biodiesel in the Transport Sector An in-depth study by Sandia National Labora-
tories and General Motors Corporation has found that plant and forestry waste and
dedicated energy crops could replace nearly a third of gasoline use by the year 2030.
Using a newly developed tool known as the Biofuels Deployment Model, or BDM,
Sandia researchers determined that 21 billion gallons of cellulosic ethanol could be
produced per year by 2022 without displacing current crops. The study, which focused
only on starch-based and cellulosic ethanol, found that an increase to 90 billion gallons
of ethanol could be sustainably achieved by 2030 within real-world economic and
environmental parameters. Given these findings, would it be morally right to ramp up
the production of cellulosic ethanol and other biofuels? (Source: Machinery lubrication
newsletter; quoted verbatim except the last sentence).
Autonomy Principle cases
AUT1: Internet Censorship and Surveillance in China The Great Firewall Project is an
internet censorship and surveillance project in China controlled by the ruling
Communist Party. By using methods such as IP blocking, DNS filtering and
redirection, and URL filtering, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security is able to
block and filter access to information deemed to be politically dissident or
“inappropriate” for other reasons. As part of this policy, searching with all Google
search engines was banned in Mainland China on March 30, 2010. The project
started in 1998 and is still in operation. Is it morally right to censor the internet in
ways that limit the freedom of internet users in China to access information
deemed to be politically dissident?
AUT2: Fracking and Self-governance in Denton In the early 2010’s many cities across
the United States passed ordinances restricting the areas in which fracking could occur
within city limits. Some concerns were public health and depreciation of private
property near the fracking sites. In November 2014 the City of Denton passed an
extremely restrictive ordinance that effectively banned fracking. In March 2015 the
Texas legislature responded by passing a bill that effectively took away the power of
cities to regulate fracking. Property owners in Denton were upset because they felt that
their independence, self-governance and freedom was restricted by this. Was it morally
right to restrict the independence, self-governance and freedom of property owners in
Denton wishing to ban fracking in the city?
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Fairness Principle cases
FP1: Broadband Access in North Dakota About 14 million rural Americans live without
broadband internet access. Fast internet can be crucial to educational and economic
success. “For rural residents,” writes Sharon Strover, a communications professor at
University of Texas-Austin, “having broadband is simply treading water or keeping up.
Not having it means sinking.” People living in the city might take for granted their
ability to take online classes, navigate websites like Healthcare.gov, or apply for jobs in
other places. Because the sparse populations of places like North Dakota make it
expensive to pay private companies to bring high-speed internet to rural regions, some
officials have called for a public solution to the problem of rural Americans being
disadvantaged by lack of broadband access. Given that so many rural Americans are
disadvantaged by lack of broadband access, it has been suggested that society should
act to ensure that all Americans can benefit from this new technology regardless of
location. Would it be morally right to subsidize broadband access in North Dakota?
FP2: The SpaceX Launchpad in Boca Chica In August 2014, Elon Musk and Rick Perry
announced that SpaceX would build the world’s first private rocket launchpad on a
remote beach not far from the city of Brownsville. The local government offered
SpaceX more than 15 million dollars in incentives and The Greater Brownsville
Incentives Corporation offered an additional 5 million in incentives to lure SpaceX
away from sites in Florida and Georgia. Located only two miles from the launchpad,
residents of the small village of Boca Chica will be subject to evacuations during
launches and their property is at risk of damage from explosions and dangerous
chemicals even during successful operations. Residents of the larger nearby city of
Brownsville will reap interest on their financial investment to bring SpaceX to the area,
but residents of Boca Chica are skeptical that they will receive any compensation for
their much greater sacrifice. Is it morally right for SpaceX to not compensate the
residents of Boca Chica?
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